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NOTES AND COMMENT
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
In the instant
case the Wisconsin Court was called upon to consider the defendant's
application for reinstatement to practice before the Wisconsin Bar. In
this connection the court chose to declare itself on the validity of chapter 480, Laws 1931, "in so far as it purports (1) to reinstate Raymond
J. Cannon (defendant) as an attorney at law; and (2) in so far as it
purports to remit the costs imposed upon Mr. Cannon by the order of
suspension." (Opinion, page 443.) The statute reads as follows: "The
license to practice law, duly issued to Raymond J. Cannon on the
thirteenth day of April, 1914, and revoked by the judgment of the
supreme court on July 5, 1929, is hereby restored, and the costs imposed by said judgment are hereby remitted, and the said Raymond J.
Cannon is hereby authorized, henceforth, to exercise all the rights and
privileges of a duly licensed member of the bar." The court held: The
statute was utterly void and unconstitutional, first,, because the ultimate power to determine who shall be admitted to the practice of law
rests exclusively with the judiciary; secondly, because the act is partial
and attempts to inure benefit to a single individual contrary to the general spirit of legislative power, which is to be exercised only "through
general laws which apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to
all;" (3) because the statute is an unlawful attempt to exercise the
power of appointment in a field which belongs exclusively to the judiciary; (4) because the act attempts to set aside and annul a court
judgment (order of suspension-see State vs. Cannon, 199 Wis 534),
a power clearly beyond the scope of any legislature. State vs. Cannon.
In re Cannon, 240 N.W. 441 (Wis.).
At present there is a great conflict of opinion and confusion both
of thought and expression as to which agency of our state governments is invested with the power to regulate and control the legal profession. 4 Texas Law Review 2. And it is on that aspect of the problem which has to do with admissions to the practice that the instant
case sheds a most significant light.
It is generally conceded that attorneys at law are officers of the
court; the control they have over the writs of the court etc. makes
them responsible in no small degree for the quality of justice administered by the court. Their relation to the court is one of trust and confidence. Every court must have a bar, and necessarily rely on it in
furthering the ends of justice. It is not illogical, therefore, that the
courts should claim the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law
to be exclusively a judicial function. Ex. p. Garland, 4 Wall 333; In re
Day, 181 Ill. 73; Vernon County Bar Assn. vs. McKibbin, 153 Wis.
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350. A power necessarily inherent in the court. Ruling Case Law, Vol.
II, p. 942. Yet, due to the fact that many of the legislatures in this
country have presumed to prescribe qualifications for the admission of
attorneys to the practice of law, no little confusion exists as to whether
the power to admit (and disbar) is inherent in the courts. State vs.
Cannon, 196 Wis. 534.
The court's claim to the inherent power to admit attorneys to the
practice is bottomed on the fact that for six centuries prior to the
adoption of our federal constitution the English court exercised such
inherent power (for summary see pages 445-448, opinion), and it was
this type of court (the English court) with all its incidental, implied,
and inherent powers, not expressly limited by either federal or state
constitution, that was borrowed for use in the federal and local jurisdictions of this country. State vs. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401.
The legislature's power to prescribe qualifications which must be
possessed by those who become licensed attorneys at law is bottomed
on the theory that it is a necessary incident to its police power. Under
the head of police power one of the very important functions of the
legislature is to protect the public from the results of incompetence,
imposition, and fraud on the part of those who undertake to practice
the learned professions and occupations requiring skill and special
training. As those who undertake to practice the legal profession may
through want of proper learning and good moral character work great
harm on those who have a right to assume that they are properly qualified to advise and protect them in their legal rights, the prescribing of
qualifications to be possessed by those who ultimately become licensed
attorney at law is properly a judicial function. (See Wis. Stat. 1929,
256.28.)
In the instant case the Wisconsin Court recognizes the fact that
the legislature as well as the judiciary has an interest in the caliber
of the bar of the state, and for that reason should be accorded the
voice which it now holds in the matter, namely, the prescribing of
qualifications for admission (see st. supra). But beyond this the court
is unwilling to accord the legislature any power in the matter. This
limitation on the power of the legislature results from the fact "that
the courts have an interest in the quality of the bar quite distinct from
and additional to the reasons which motivate legislative regulation"
(opinion page 445). As has been mentioned supra the courts must
necessarily rely on the bar for help in administering the powers of
sovereignity with which the courts have been entrusted by the constitution, therefore, any misconduct or unfaithfulness on the part of any
member of the bar may very easily bring about maladministration of
their powers, and conquential scandal and reproach of the courts by the
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people. With the responsibility for the plane on which the administration
justice is maintained resting, then, exclusively on the courts, which
must necessarily rely on the bar to aid them in performing their tasks,
it is not illogical that the courts' interest in the quality of the bar
should transcend that of the legislature, which is in no way responsible
for the manner in which the courts exercise their sovereign powers.
In the instant case the court bottomed its claim to the right to ultimately determine who is to be admitted to practice before it on the
ground of inherent power. It is respectfully submitted that whenever a
court claims inherent power it opens itself to collateral attack by those
who deny the existence of inherent power in our American courts. It
was to defeat just such an attack as this that the learned justice bolstered his decision in the case by intimating that those who deny the
court inherent power in the premises, nevertheless, readily concede
that it possesses implied power therein (opinion page 449), and once
the court's power be conceded in the premises, in the words of the
learned justice, "the matter of its proper designation may afford an
intriguing subject for mental sparring; but whether it be implied or
inherent results in no substantial difference to the citizen or the rights
and liberties of the people."
Disregarding the other points involved in the case, which in the
opinion of the reviewer require no special elucidation or comment, the
significant rule of the case is the holding-that a legislature is without
power to enact a statute restoring to an attorney his license previously
revoked by the supreme court, on the ground that it is an encroachment of the judiciary's power to fix additional qualifications for attorneys, which in the opinion of the judiciary are necessary for the
proper administration of judicial functions.
EUGENE PAUL LECHER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION-HUSBAND AND WIFE. In a
recent decision, Hoeper vs. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, _. U.S.
... 52 Sup. Ct. Reporter 120, the United States Supreme Court in
overruling the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, declares void the enactments of the Wisconsin legislature, (Wis. Stats. 1929, 71.05 (2) ; 71.09
(4),1 providing for the addition of the wife's income to the husband's
'Sec. 71.05 (2) (d) : In computing taxes and the amount of taxes payable by
persons residing together as members of a family, the income of the wife,
and the income of each child under eighteen years of age shall be added to
that of the husband or father, or if he be not living, to that of the head of the
family and assessed to him except as hereinafter provided. The taxes levied
shall be payable by such husband or head of the family but if not paid by him
may be enforced against any person whose income is included within the tax
computation.

